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GLOBAL WARMING AND ORIGINALISM: 
THE ROLE OF THE EPA IN THE  
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
Joshua K. Westmoreland* 
Abstract: Anthropogenic warming will devastate the world if it is not 
abated. Abating such warming will require a long-term strategy that starts 
with immediate and drastic action in the form of new laws designed to re-
strict greenhouse gas emissions. In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA, Presi-
dent Obama is likely to issue an executive order requiring the EPA Ad-
ministrator to issue strict regulations addressing greenhouse gas emissions 
from mobile sources under the Clean Air Act. However, such executive 
action will surely spark a flood of lawsuits challenging the scope of execu-
tive power. This Note addresses the merits of such lawsuits and uses uni-
tary executive theory to argue that the President’s executive power in-
cludes the power to control the EPA rule-making process. 
Introduction 
 Barack Obama has assumed the presidency at a time when the 
consequences of global warming demand immediate action.1 Unfortu-
nately, immediate action is not likely to come in the form of legisla-
tion,2 as any congressional climate change proposal will likely be 
thwarted because it is too costly to society, or it will be so diluted by leg-
islative compromise that it will be ineffective.3 A recent Gallup Poll 
highlighted that there is a growing number of Americans who are skep-
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2009–2010. 
1 See infra Part I. 
2 John M. Broder, As Time Run Short for Global Climate Treaty, Nations May Settle for In-
terim Steps, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 2009, at A13. 
3 See David Epso & Andrew Taylor, House, Senate Panels Take up Revised Obama Budget, 
Huffington Post, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/25/house-
senate-panels-take-_n_178932.html; Dan Froomkin, White House Watch: Obama Getting 
Tougher with Congress, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/white-house-watch/2009/03/ 
obama_getting_tougher_with_con.html (Mar. 18, 2009, 10:32 EST); Manu Raju, Moderates 
Uneasy with Obama Plan, Politico, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 
0309/19587.html. 
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tical of the science underlying global warming.4 Such polling is spur-
ring some members of Congress to oppose climate legislation.5 
 However, the Obama Administration is aware of the threats posed 
by global warming.6 The Administration is poised to act following on 
endangerment finding from the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) declaring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from mobile sources 
to be a type of pollutant that is dangerous to public health and wel-
fare.7 In the wake of the endangerment finding, President Obama will 
most likely build on the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA8 by initiating the regulatory process to control GHG emissions in 
the United States under the authority of the Clean Air Act (CAA).9 
 President Obama’s global warming agenda cannot be divorced 
from his larger progressive agenda.10 Professor Michael Waldman, Ex-
ecutive Director of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York Univer-
sity School of Law, notes that even though Obama’s election was a ref-
erendum for progressive change, his ability to achieve his policy 
agenda—including steps to address global warming—will depend on 
defeating constitutional challenges from conservatives.11 In particular, 
                                                                                                                      
4 Lydia Saad, Increased Number Think Global Warming Is Exaggerated, Gallup, Mar. 11, 2009, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116590/Increased-Number-Think-Global-Warming-Exagger- 
ated.aspx. 
5 See Aaron Wiener, Economic Crisis Sidelines Global Warming Concerns, Wash. Indep., Mar. 17, 
2009, http://washingtonindependent.com/34049/economic-crisis-sidelines-global-warming-concerns. 
But see John Kerry & Lindsey Graham, Yes We Can (Pass Climate Change Legislation), Op-Ed., N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 11, 2009, at WK11 (outlining five principles to provide a framework for passing cli-
mate change legislation). 
6 See Darren Samuelsohn, Leaked EPA Document Shows Endangerment Finding on Fast 
Track, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/03/10/10green- 
wire-epa-document-shows-endangerment-finding-on-fas-10053.html; Ian Talley, U.S. Climate 
Czar: C02 Regulation Ruling Coming Soon, Dow Jones Newswire, Feb. 23, 2009, http://www. 
cattlenetwork.com/Content.asp?ContentID=293121; see also Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 
Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
7 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,496–97 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be 
codified at 7 C.F.R. ch 1); Saumelsohn, supra note 6. The endangerment finding brings 
such emissions within the purview of the Clean Air Act. See generally David W. Kreutzer & 
Karen A. Campbell, The Heritage Center for Data Analysis, CDA08–10, CO2-Emission 
Cuts: The Economic Costs of the EPA’s ANPR Regulations (2009), available at http:// 
www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/upload/CDA_08_10.pdf (discussing 
the potential impact from EPA regulation under the CAA of GHGs). 
8 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
9 See Kreutzer & Campbell, supra note 7, at 1 & n.2; Samuelsohn, supra note 6. 
10 See Wiener, supra note 5. 
11 Michael Waldman, A Brewing Court Battle: Obama’s Ambitious Agenda Will be Scrutinized 
and Second-guessed by Conservative Federal Judges, Newsweek, Mar. 23, 2009, at 35, 35; Newt 
 
2010] Executive Authority to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions 227 
conservatives will likely contest Obama’s constitutional authority to ini-
tiate a regulatory response to global warming.12 Responding to attacks 
regarding presidential authority will be a formidable task because a ma-
jority of the judges in the federal judiciary are ideologically conserva-
tive.13 Moreover, Professor Waldman notes that conservative federal 
judges tend to rely on the theoretical framework of originalism.14 If the 
Obama Administration attempts to regulate GHG emissions, it will 
need to defend the constitutionality of the action on the basis of 
originalism or it will need to articulate an argument against original-
ism.15 
 Given that such an action, if taken, will inevitably receive polictical 
and legal criticism, this Note anticipates and answers such critiques in 
two ways. First, this Note presents a policy argument that President 
Obama should take immediate action to regulate GHGs from mobile 
sources by issuing an executive order instructing the EPA Administrator 
to initiate the rulemaking process.16 Given the severity of the threats 
posed by global warming and its consequences if action is not taken 
now, Part I of this Note argues for immediate presidential action.17 
Parts II through VI of this Note defend the constitutionality of this pol-
icy proposal. Part II details unitary executive theory, as justified by 
originalism, as a framework for evaluating presidential action.18 Section 
B of Part II extrapolates the limits of a unitary executive via Justice 
                                                                                                                      
Gingrich, Message to Copenhagen: Our Constitution Begins, ‘We the People . . .’, Human Events, 
Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=34850 (responding to the 
EPA endangerment finding by noting that using the finding to use the agency to regulate 
greenhouse gasses “would be a breathtakingly anti-democratic and unconstitutional arro-
gation of power on the part of the President”). 
12 Waldman, supra note 11, at 35; see Jon Anderson, Indec Sues Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative over Carbon Cap and Trade Program, Boston Envtl. Pol’y Examiner, Mar. 22, 
2009, http://www.examiner.com/x-5908-Boston-Environmental-Policy-Examiner~y2009m 
3d22-Indec-sues-Regional-Greenhouse-Gas-Initiative-over-carbon-cap-and-trade-program; 
Stephen Ohlemacher, Obama to Use Executive Orders for Immediate Environmental Impact, 
Huffington Post, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/10/obama-
to-use-executive-or_n_142595.html. 
13 Neil A. Lewis, Stark Contrasts Between McCain and Obama in Judicial Wars, N.Y. Times 
May 28, 2008, at A17; Jerry Markon, The Politics of the Federal Bench: Obama’s Appointments Are 
Expected to Reshape the U.S. Legal Landscape, Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 2008, at A01; Waldman, 
supra note 11, at 35. 
14 See Waldman, supra note 11, at 35. 
15 See id. 
16 See infra Parts I, III. 
17 See infra Part I. 
18 See infra Part II. 
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Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.19 Part III dis-
cusses how the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA20 pro-
vides the groundwork for the CAA to become a vehicle for addressing 
global warming.21 Part IV provides background on administrative agen-
cies, the Administrative Procedure Act, the EPA, and the CAA.22 Part V 
uses unitary executive theory to define the proper roles of agencies, the 
EPA, and Administrator Lisa Jackson.23 Part VI argues that President 
Obama would be constitutionally justified in using his executive power 
to address GHG emissions by ordering the EPA Administrator to issue 
GHG-reducing regulations under the authority of the CAA.24 
I. The Dangers of Global Warming 
 Global climate change has the potential to be truly catastrophic.25 
The driving force behind climate change is global warming, which is 
caused by the greenhouse effect.26 The greenhouse effect refers to the 
warming of the earth over time as a layer of insulating gases traps solar 
heat inside the earth’s atmosphere.27 There are both natural and hu-
man (anthropogenic) causes of GHG emissions.28 Current studies indi-
cate that there is a strong likelihood that the increase in the global 
temperature is primarily the result of human activities.29 There is a vir-
tual consensus among leading scientists that global warming is real and 
that the current rates of warming are largely attributable to human ac-
tivities.30 
                                                                                                                      
19 343 US 579 (1952) (providing a method for evaluating the constitutionality of exer-
cises of executive power, principally unilateral presidential action); see infra Part II.B. 
20 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
21 See infra Part III. 
22 See infra Part IV. 
23 See infra Part V. 
24 See infra Part VI. 
25 Ross Gelbspan, Boiling Point 1, 16–17 (2004). 
26 Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Science Brief: The Causes of Global 
Climate Change 1 (Aug. 2008) [hereinafter Science Brief]. 
27 Id. at 1–2. 
28 Id. at 1. 
29 Id. at 2; see Maureen D. Avakian et al., The Origin, Fate, and Health Effects of Combustion 
By-products: A Research Framework, 110 Envtl. Health Persp. 1155, 1155 (2002); Ari N. 
Sommer, Note, Taking the Pit Bull off the Leash: Siccing the Endangered Species Act on Climate 
Change, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 273, 277-79 (2009). 
30 Working Groups I, II, & III to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report 5 (Rajenda K. Pachauri et al., eds. 
2007); Science Brief, supra note 26, at 2; Avakian et al., supra note 29, at 1155; Naomi 
Oreskes, Essay, The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 Science 1686, 1686 (2004). 
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 Human-induced-global warming is mostly attributable to the utili-
zation of combustion-powered machines.31 One way to categorize com-
bustion-powered machines is by distinguishing whether the machine is 
stationary or mobile.32 Stationary sources of GHGs include factories, 
power plants, and refineries.33 Mobile sources, which are generally 
found in the transportation sector, include “passenger cars and light 
trucks, heavy duty trucks and off-road vehicles, and rail, marine, and air 
transport.”34 The latest research indicates that mobile sources account 
for at least one third of the total GHG emissions in the United States.35 
 Conservative projections indicate that global warming is happen-
ing rapidly and is irreparably changing the earth’s ecosystems.36 Many 
species will become extinct or will be pushed to the brink of extinction 
as a result of human-induced climate change.37 James E. Hansen, Di-
rector of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, noted that the 
global climate system is approaching various tipping points.38 If human 
emission rates continue at their current pace, the results could be very 
grim: sea levels will rise due to melting ice caps and hundreds of mil-
lions of people will be displaced from their homelands.39 Mass extinc-
tions will be as likely as they were during the previous warming periods 
in the earth’s history.40 Even assuming a gradual phase-out of all GHG 
emissions by the year 2300, scientific models predict dire consequences 
                                                                                                                      
31 Avakian et al., supra note 29, at 1155. 
32 See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Congressional Policy Brief: Poli-
cies to Reduce Emission from the Transportation Sector 1 (Nov. 2008) [hereinafter 
Policy Brief], available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Transportation.pdf; 
Avakian et al., supra note 29, at 1155. 
33 Policy Brief, supra note 32, at 1. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. Given that the United States is the second largest emitter of GHGs, mobile source 
emissions in the United States represent a significant portion of global GHG emissions. Brad 
Knickerbocker, China Now Biggest Emitter, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 28, 2007, at 12; see 
also Climate Change: The Big Emitters, BBC News, July 4, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
science/nature/3143798.stm. 
36 Gelbspan, supra note 25, at 1, 36; John Roach, By 2050 Warming to Doom Millions Spe-
cies, Study Says, Nat’l Geographic News, July 12, 2004, http://news.nationalgeographic. 
com/news/2004/01/0107_040107_extinction.html. 
37 Gelbspan, supra note 25, at 1, 36; Roach, supra note 36. 
38 James Hansen, Dir., Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. Goddard Inst. for Space Stud-
ies, Address at National Press Club: Global Warming Twenty Years Later 1–2 ( June 23, 2008), 
available at http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TwentyYearsLater_20080623.pdf. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 2. 
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unless immediate action is taken.41 Reports show that some effects of 
global warming are already irreversible.42 
 The effects of global warming also have the potential to spill over 
into the realm of national security and politics.43 Global warming may 
deplete precious resources; result in infrastructure-destroying weather 
that will wreak economic havoc; create large numbers of refugees and 
migrants; and make weak governments susceptible to extremist take-
overs.44 Consequently, civil, regional, and international war may be-
come more common.45 
 Presently, the American public is divided on the importance of 
global warming,46 and the government’s position on international cli-
mate agreements has hurt the United States’ credibility abroad.47 Do-
mestically, the lack of a concerted effort to change Americans’ con-
sumption patterns has eviscerated the possibility of climate 
consciousness for most of the population.48 A new Pew Center survey of 
twenty national priorities for 2009 indicates that global warming ranks 
lowest.49 Furthermore, since global warming is a worldwide problem, 
international cooperation will be imperative in order to achieve any 
meaningful reduction in GHG emissions.50 The United States’ refusal 
to commit to any binding international climate treaties or agreements 
compromises its credibility and interferes with global efforts to combat 
                                                                                                                      
41 Andreas Schmittner et al., Future Changes in Climate, Ocean Circulation, Ecosystems, and 
Biogeochemical Cycling Simulated Simulated for a Business as Usual CO2 Emission Scenario Until 
Year 4000 AD, 22 Global Biogeochemical Cycles 1, 16 (2008), available at http://mgg. 
coas.oregonstate.edu/~andreas/pdf/S/schmittner08gbc.pdf. 
42 See Susan Solomon, Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 
Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 1704, 1704 (Feb. 10, 2009) (noting that climate change due to 
carbon dioxide emissions is irreversible for at least 1000 years). 
43 See CNA Corp., National Security and the Threat of Climate Change 13–18 
(2007), available at http://www.npr.org/documents/2007/apr/security_climate.pdf; Gelbspan, 
supra note 25, at 1, 37. 
44 See CNA Corp., supra note 43, at 13–17. 
45 See id. at 18; see also Walter Russell Mead, Markets Biggest Threat to Peace, L.A. Times, 
Aug. 23, 1998, at M1 (arguing that the collapse of the global economy would be the big-
gest risk of a new World War). 
46 Pew Res. Ctr. for the People and the Press, Economy, Jobs Trump All Other 
Policy Priorities in 2009 ( Jan. 22, 2009) http://people-press.org/report/485/economy-
top-policy-priority [hereinafter Jobs Trump]. 
47 See Gelbspan, supra note 25, at 1, 37. 
48 See Jobs Trump, supra note 46; Juliet Schor, The New Politics of Consumption: Why Amer-
icans Want So Much More Than They Need, Boston Rev., Summer 1999, at 4, passim, available 
at http://bostonreview.net/BR24.3/schor.html. 
49 Jobs Trump, supra note 46. 
50 See Gelbspan, supra note 25, at 1, 37. 
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global warming.51 Other major GHG-emitting countries simply will not 
take action without such commitments from the United States.52 
 Current proposals to address global warming fail to take immedi-
ate action to curb U.S. emissions from mobile sources.53 A recent con-
gressional proposal dealing with climate change was the Boxer-
Lieberman-Warner Resolution.54 Two problems were immediately evi-
dent with this proposal. First, the proposed action would have been 
gradual, unfolding over the course of years, and GHG emissions would 
not have immediately been impacted.55 Second, the proposal com-
pletely ignored mobile sources of GHGs, focusing exclusively on im-
plementing a cap-and-trade program for stationary sources.56 The se-
verity of global warming demands that the government act quickly, and 
mobile sources are prime targets for emission reductions given their 
substantial contributions to warming.57 Furthermore, the American 
public’s ambivalence toward global warming58 and its opponents’ suc-
                                                                                                                      
51 See id.; Nigel Purvis, U.S. Global Leadership to Safeguard Our Climate, Se-
curity, Economy 5, 6–7(2008), available at https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/ 
handle/10207/10917/ClimateChange.Purvis.FINAL.pdf. By a vote of 95–0, the Senate 
passed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which prohibits the United States from becoming a 
signatory to any treaty or international agreement designed to limit GHG emissions unless 
developing countries—including China and India—do not receive exemptions from such 
agreements. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
52See Purvis, supra note 51, at 5, 6–7; Broder, supra note 2. 
53 See, e.g., Press Release, Greenpeace et al., Broad Coalition Criticizes Climate Bill (May 
22, 2009), available at http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/press-center/releases2/broad-co- 
alition-criticizes-cli (criticizing the American Clean Energy and Security Act , H.R. 2454, 
111th Cong. (2009)). 
54 See Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Economy-wide Cap-and-Trade Propos-
als in the 110th Congress as of December 1, 2008, at 1(2008) [hereinafter Cap-and-
Trade Proposals], available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Chart-and-Graph-
120108.pdf; Deborah Sliz & Karen Zanoff, The Congressional Stalemate on Energy Policy: Can It Be 
Broken?, Bulletin (Nw. Pub. Power Ass’n, Vancouver, Wash.), Sept. 1, 2008, http://www. 
allbusiness.com/government/elections-politics-politics-political-parties/11568698-1.html. 
55 See Cap-and-Trade Proposals, supra note 54, at 1; Sliz & Zanoff, supra note 54. 
56 See Cap-and-Trade Proposals, supra note 54, at 1; Sliz & Zanoff, supra note 54. 
57 Policy Brief, supra note 32, at 1. Mobile emissions are particularly high in the 
United States, where artificially cheap gasoline has led to a disproportionately high rate of 
automobile usage compared to other developed countries. Robert Bryce, Gasoline Is Cheap: 
Four Dollars a Gallon Is Outrageous! We Should be Paying Much More, Slate, May 15, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2191491/. Like the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner proposal, Presi-
dent Obama’s latest call for Congress to implement fuel efficiency standards is inadequate 
in light of the severity of global warming; his proposal focuses on long-term, gradual ac-
tion by the auto industry rather than on making immediate cuts in emissions from mobile 
sources. John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order Likely to Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 26, 2009, at A1. 
58 Jobs Trump, supra note 46. 
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cessful filibuster of the Boxer-Lieberman-Warner proposal, suggests 
that any proposal will face a tough battle in Congress.59 
II. A Framework for Executive Action 
A. Theoretical and Legal Underpinnings 
 One prominent theory regarding presidential power is the unitary 
executive theory.60 It is based on the Vesting Clause in Article II, Sec-
tion 1 of the United States Constitution,61 which states that “[t]he ex-
ecutive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.”62 The unitary executive theory posits that the President has 
complete power to execute the law and, consequently, has complete 
control over the actions of all executive agencies.63 Conversely, the the-
ory states that, since power has not been vested in either of the other 
two branches of government, the President alone has the power to exe-
cute the laws of the land.64 
 Unitary executive theory is premised on constitutional originalism 
(originalism), which is the notion that the text of the Constitution 
should be understood as it was understood when it was ratified and that 
this original understanding should be the sole meaning given to the 
text.65 There are four methodological steps in employing originalism, 
the last three of which are used successively only if the meaning of the 
text in question is still elusive.66 The first methodological step examines 
the “plain meaning” of the constitutional text in question and “con-
strue[s] [the words] holistically in light of the entire document.”67 The 
goal with this step is to ascertain the meaning of the text under review 
from the perspective of a person living at the time of the Constitution’s 
                                                                                                                      
59 Sliz & Zanoff, supra note 54. 
60 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who 
Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive By Steven G. Calabresi and John 
Christopher Yoo, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 593 (2010) (book review) (providing background on 
the unitary executive theory. 
61 Id. at 3. 
62 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
63 See Pierce, supra note 60, at 3. 
64 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the 
Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 549 (1994). 
65 See id. at 551. 
66 See id. at 552–53. 
67 See id. The call to read the text in light of the whole document is consistent with the 
theory of intertextuality. See infra notes 111–116 and accompanying text. 
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ratification.68 Thus, a dictionary or grammar manual germane to the 
time of the Constitution’s ratification should be the only tool necessary 
to determine the plain meaning of the text.69 
 If such a tool does not clarify the plain meaning of the text, then 
one should proceed to the second methodological step: a review of any 
publicized or widely dispersed explanatory statements about the text 
that were disseminated contemporaneously to Constitution’s ratifica-
tion.70 If “ambiguity still persists,” one then reviews the private state-
ments made prior to or at the time of the ratification of the Constitu-
tion.71 Finally, if the plain meaning of the text cannot be ascertained 
from the three preceding steps, the analysis should then consider 
postratification history.72 However, it is important to note that when 
employing originalism, the focus is on what the public would have un-
derstood at the time of ratification, not on the private thoughts of the 
drafters or others close to the process.73 
 Thus, under originalism, the term “vested” from the Vesting Clause 
of Article II, Section 1 means “‘[t]o place in possession’ of an individual 
or entity.”74 The plain meaning of the Vesting Clause is that the Presi-
dent is given the sole responsibility of executing the laws of the United 
States; it is an explicit grant of power to the President as the chief execu-
tive.75 This understanding of vested is also consistent with the word’s use 
in Article III, which states that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”76 Article III can 
be interpreted to mean that judicial power is exclusively granted to the 
Supreme Court and other congressionally created courts.77 Conversely, 
if the definition of “vested” is not interpreted as an exclusive grant of 
judicial power, the Supreme Court and the inferior courts lack any con-
                                                                                                                      
68 See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of 
the Law 144 (1990); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 64, at 553. 
69 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 64, at 553. 
70 See id.; see also Bork, supra note 68, at 144. 
71 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 64, at 553. 
72 See id. 
73 Bork, supra note 68, at 144; see Henry Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Ad-
judication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 725–27 (1988). 
74 Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 64, at 572 (citing 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary 
of the English Language 2102 (Librairie du Liban ed. 1978) (4th ed. 1773)). 
75 See id. at 562, 574, 579; see also Harold H. Bruff, Balance of Forces: Separation 
of Powers Law in the Administrative State 448–49 (2006). 
76 U.S. Const., art. III, § 1. 
77 See Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
701, 714. 
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crete authority.78 Applying the same logic to Article II, since it does not 
vest executive authority in any other branch of government, no other 
branch has any power to execute the laws of the United States because 
“vested” is understood to be an exclusive and explicit grant of power to 
the President.79 
 As the first of three arguments favoring originalism, several 
prominent constitutional scholars support originalism as the most ap-
propriate method of constitutional interpretation.80 As noted by for-
mer Court of Appeals Judge Robert H. Bork, the law is supposed to 
function as a neutral yardstick, providing guidance and settling dis-
putes.81 Consequently, interpretation of the law, particularly the Consti-
tution, should not include judgments based on personal morals and 
values.82 Former United States Attorney General and constitutional law 
scholar Edwin Meese III notes that an originalist methodology ensures 
the law’s neutrality and freedom from personal bias because it is based 
on the assumption that each word in the Constitution has a discrete 
and concrete meaning.83 Originalism facilitates the ascription of defini-
tive meaning to the Constitution.84 For instance, when the Constitution 
states in Article II that to be President an individual must be at least 
thirty-five years old, it literally means that any President must have lived 
for at least thirty-five years; it does not mean that the person must have 
obtained maturity equivalent to that of the average thirty-five-year-old.85 
The descriptions of the organization of the House and Senate are also 
very specific.86 
 Some scholars suggest that this line of reasoning is problematic 
because the words of the text are vague in many instances and require 
judgment calls regarding their level of abstraction.87 Originalist doc-
trine accounts for this by constraining abstractions to the likely scope 
during the time of ratification.88 One prominent scholar, Professor 
                                                                                                                      
78 See id. 
79 See id.; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 64, at 571. 
80 See generally Bork, supra note 68; Bruff, supra note 75; Edwin Meese III, Interpreting 
the Constitution, in Interpreting the Constitution: The Debate over Original Intent 
13 ( Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 64; Prakash, supra note 77. 
81 See Bork, supra note 68, at 143–46. 
82 See id. at 146–47. 
83 See Meese, supra note 80, at 15–17. 
84 See id. 
85 See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291, 305 
(2007). 
86 See U.S. Const. art. I; Meese, supra note 80, at 15–17. 
87 See Bork, supra note 68, at 148–49. 
88 See id. 
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Akhil Amar, has implied that conceptualizing the Constitution as a neu-
tral document to be read for its plain meaning, free from personal val-
ues and morals, makes the most sense given that the Constitution was 
written by “the People” and is supposed to be accessible to ordinary 
citizens.89 Many scholars have noted that maintaining a stable and con-
sistent meaning for the people is essential to the continued legitimacy 
of the Constitution.90 
 Secondly, the historical context in which the framers of the Consti-
tution operated also supports originalism.91 Many prominent framers 
saw the Constitution as a neutral document with a precise meaning re-
gardless of personal beliefs.92 James Madison, who is thought of as the 
father of the Constitution,93 concurred with Thomas Jefferson’s belief 
that “[o]ur peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitu-
tion. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.”94 Madison thus 
understood the Constitution not as a living document, but as a specific 
declaration of government and rights.95 Furthermore, Madison thought 
that construing the Constitution based on nonliteral interpretation was 
a biased methodology and did not reflect the intended use of the doc-
ument.96 
 In addition to the framers’ understanding of the function of the 
Constitution, the public’s general understanding of legal interpretation 
at the time of the Constitution’s ratification affirms the primacy of 
originalism.97 A largely Protestant people wrote the Constitution.98 As 
Professor H. Jefferson Powell notes, the phrase sola scriptura captures a 
core belief of post-Reformation Protestants.99 This phrase refers to the 
belief that “all things necessary for salvation and concerning faith and 
life are taught in the Bible clearly enough for the ordinary believer to 
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find it there and understand.”100 The Protestants rejected nonliteral 
interpretations of the Bible, focusing instead on the text’s plain mean-
ing.101 Prior to coming to what is now the United States, Puritans in 
England criticized nonliteral interpretations of the law and protested 
against judges who inserted their own biases into their rulings.102 Puri-
tans demanded legal reform to ensure a stable law that could be dis-
cerned by looking to the plain meaning of the text of a statute, a 
method obviously similar to their adherence to sola scriptura.103 While 
this call for reform did not lead to real change in Britain, it was an im-
portant “intellectual foundation” of the founders of the United 
States104 It was in the context of this intellectual foundation that the 
founders encumbered the Constitution with their intent that its plain 
meaning controlled its interpretation.105 The framers rejected the prac-
tice of asserting nonliteral meanings and subsequently applying subjec-
tive interpretations of the law, which had become commonplace in 
Britain.106 
 Common law at the time of the Constitution’s ratification is also 
instructive in affirming the legitimacy of originalism.107 In designing 
and drafting the Constitution, the framers drew from their experience 
with English common law, which required skill in determining a law’s 
intent or intention.108 John Marshall, writing under the pseudonym “A 
Friend of the Constitution,” noted in an 1819 letter to the Alexandria 
Gazette that “intention is the most sacred rule of interpretation . . . .”109 
For the framers, the intent of a law did not come from a nonliteral in-
terpretation of the law but, rather, from the plain meaning of the 
text.110 
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 A final justification for originalism is the Constitution’s intratextual-
ity.111 Intratextuality refers to the Constitution’s repeated use of certain 
terms and language structures.112 Repeated uses of terms and language 
structures allow the Constitution to function as its own dictionary to the 
extent that meaning can be extracted by comparing the different uses of 
the same words.113 Therefore, a “contested word or phrase that appears 
in the Constitution [is read] in light of another passage in the Constitu-
tion featuring the same (or a very similar) word or phrase.”114 Seeing 
the Constitution through the lens of intratextualism is advantageous 
because it understands the document as a complete statement on gov-
ernment, and not as a compilation of unrelated articles, sections, and 
clauses.115 Moreover, since intratextualism is intuitive—identical words 
and phrases in the Constitution have identical meanings—it increases 
ordinary citizens’ access to the Constitution and to the law, solidifying 
the democratic philosophy underlying the United States government.116 
B. Evaluating Executive Action: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 
 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer offers a framework for evaluating the legitimacy of 
presidential action.117 North Korea invaded the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) on June 24, 1950, and the United States interpreted the 
aggression as a Soviet Union-instigated power play on behalf of all 
communists.118 Truman braced the country for protracted involvement, 
in part, by preparing the domestic economy to support a long-term war 
effort.119 For Truman, greater United States involvement in Korea in-
cluded passing the Defense Production Act of 1950, which was designed 
to spur increased production of strategic materials, including steel.120 
 Concurrently, steel industry labor unions and the steel companies 
disagreed about the terms of their most recent collective bargaining 
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agreement.121 After months of negotiations, the union gave notice of its 
intent to commence a nationwide strike.122 Truman saw the strike as a 
danger to the United States’ national security, as steel was necessary to 
carry on the war effort.123 Truman issued an executive order directing 
the Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel industry.124 
 The steel companies sued the Secretary of Commerce in Federal 
District Court, arguing that the President did not have the legislative or 
constitutional authority to seize the steel industry.125 Upon appeal, the 
Supreme Court ruled that Truman’s executive order was an unconsti-
tutional use of his presidential power.126 Seven opinions were filed in 
Youngstown,127 but Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion has become the 
most widely cited opinion.128 
 Justice Jackson rejected Truman’s seizure because Congress had 
never authorized it and he believed that there were no inherent consti-
tutional powers allowing the President to do it.129 Jackson laid the 
framework for evaluating presidential power by declaring that 
“[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on their 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”130 Jackson laid out 
three categories of presidential action, each with its own degree of pre-
sumed constitutionality.131 The first and least suspect category of action 
is when the “President acts pursuant to an express or implied authori-
zation of Congress.”132 Specifically, the Court would likely uphold 
presidential action pursuant to an express or implied grant of power by 
Congress because it is this type of federal power arrangement that the 
Constitution explicitly envisions.133 The second category of action is 
“[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority.”134 This category of action is different from the first 
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category because the “Congress [and the President] may have concur-
rent authority,” and legitimacy of such actions may hinge on the na-
tional and international circumstances at the time.135 The third and 
final category of presidential action is “[w]hen the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress.”136 This category is the most suspect since it indicates that the 
President may be disregarding the will of Congress and attempting to 
prevail on his own powers.137 
 On several occasions, the Supreme Court has utilized and ex-
tended Jackson’s Youngstown methodology.138 One important affirma-
tion came in Dames & Moore v. Regan.139 In response to a constitutional 
and statutory challenge by Dames & Moore, the Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of an executive order using Jackson’s opinion in 
Youngstown as a guide.140 The court upheld the presidential nullifica-
tion of a judgment in favor of Dames & Moore.141 However, the court 
ruled that Regan did not have the statutory or constitutional authority 
to prohibit Dames & Moore, or any other party, from further legal pro-
ceedings against the Iranian defendants or anyone else.142 In uphold-
ing presidential nullification of orders of judgment and attachment, 
the court cited a specific authorization by Congress in the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).143 Because the IEEPA did 
not authorize the President to prohibit the pursuit of legal rights in a 
court of law, Regan could not use an executive order to prevent Dames 
& Moore from suing the Iranian defendants.144 
 In addition to statutes, the Court has ruled that treaties also consti-
tute a source of authority that Presidents can use to form and execute 
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policy in the United States.145 For example, in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs 
Band of Chippewa Indians the Supreme Court ruled that treaties, “every 
bit as much as statutes, are sources of law and may authorize Executive 
actions.”146 However, in Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court clarified 
that non-self-executing treaties cannot authorize domestic implementa-
tion of treaty policy unless the Senate has consented to the treaty pur-
suant to Article II of the Constitution.147 In Medellín, the court disal-
lowed President George W. Bush’s attempt to give domestic effect to an 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision that ruled that Medellín’s 
Vienna Convention rights had been violated and that his state murder 
conviction should be reviewed.148 The Court reasoned that because the 
ICJ ruling was premised on a non-self-executing treaty provision and 
the treaty provision lacked the consent of the Senate, the President 
could not implement treaty policy that would interfere with Texas’s 
pursuit of justice.149 The rationale for this decision is that if the Presi-
dent could implement such a treaty without the consent of the Senate, 
then the President would be creating law for United States in violation 
of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.150 
 Additionally, Medellín v. Texas illustrates two other principles re-
lated to Jackson’s method. The first principle is that legitimate grants of 
authority to the President cannot authorize the President to act in ways 
that violate separation of powers principles.151 The first principle is ar-
ticulated when the Court suggests that non-self-executing treaties, with-
out the advise and consent of the Senate, cannot authorize the Presi-
dent to implement treaty provisions domestically because that would 
eclipse Congress’s constitutional duty to be the sole legislative body.152 
The logic becomes clear if one reframes the principle in the following 
way: the President is merely implementing the will of Congress if he 
executes a treaty previously consented to by the Senate.153 
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 The second principle is that grants of authority to the President 
are to be interpreted narrowly with regards to the scope of the powers 
granted.154 The second principle can be seen in the Court’s refusal to 
interpret a statutory grant of authority to the President to represent the 
United States before the United Nations, the ICJ, and Security Council 
as a simultaneous, implicit endowment of “unilateral authority to create 
domestic law.”155 Representing the United States before various inter-
national bodies does not extend to the President the authority to uni-
laterally implement international law unless specified by Congress.156 
This understanding follows from the Court’s basing its interpretation of 
presidential duties arising out of treaty obligations on the plain mean-
ing of a treaty’s text.157 
III. Massachusetts v. EPA: A Foundation for Immediate Action 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA opened a 
window for future EPA attempts to regulate GHG emissions under the 
CAA.158 One issue in the case was whether the EPA had the authority 
and obligation to regulate GHG emissions from mobile sources under 
section 202 of the Act.159 A group of states, local governments, and pri-
vate organizations argued that the EPA—by not issuing regulations de-
signed to curb pollution from mobile sources—had failed to comply 
with the mandates in section 202(a)(1) of the CAA.160 The EPA’s posi-
tion was that GHGs did not fall within the CAA’s definition of air pollu-
tion; therefore, the Act did not grant the EPA authority to address 
GHGs and climate change.161 
 Congress defined air pollutant as “any air pollution agent or com-
bination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, 
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radioactive (including source material, special nuclear material, and 
byproduct material) substance or matter which is emitted into or oth-
erwise enters the ambient air.”162 Given this definition, petitioners ar-
gued that greenhouse gases were a form of air pollution.163 The Court 
agreed.164 Responding to the EPA’s argument that Congress did not 
intend for GHGs to be included within the purview of section 302’s 
definition of air pollution, the Court noted that the Act was clearly anti-
thetical to the EPA’s understanding since the “definition embraces all 
airborne compounds of whatever stripe, and underscores that intent 
through the repeated use of the word ‘any.’ [GHGs] . . . are without a 
doubt ‘physical [and] chemical . . . substance[s] which [are] emitted 
into . . . the ambient air.’”165 Thus, the Court ruled that regulating 
GHG emissions was within the authority that Congress granted to the 
EPA in the CAA.166 
IV. Understanding Agencies, the APA, and the EPA 
 At this point, there is a need to provide some background infor-
mation about governmental agencies, particularly the EPA, to fully un-
derstand the scope of the President’s executive power. This part of the 
Note first discusses the general role of administrative agencies and the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and then discusses the specific 
role of the EPA and its Administrator. 
A. Agencies and the APA 
 The basic function of administrative agencies is to transform con-
gressional policies concrete action.167 The administrative state in the 
United States can trace its roots to the late 1800s with the creation of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).168 Decades later, the 
Great Depression lead to increased governmental control of the econ-
omy, and Congress created many more commissions and agencies as 
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part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal.169 Anti-New Dealers 
used the courts to challenge the dramatic growth of the government, 
but Roosevelt was able to thwart that strategy with the threat of packing 
the Supreme Court with justices sympathetic to New Deal policies.170 
Consequently, anti-New Dealers turned to Congress to pass legislation 
that would check the growth of government and bureaucracy.171 Spe-
cifically, the anti-New Dealers wanted to prevent the rise of an “arbi-
trary, tyrannical government.”172 Congress passed the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) in 1946, designing it to function as “the bill of 
rights for the new regulatory state.”173 
 With few exceptions, the APA exists today as it did in 1946.174 It pro-
tects the American public from arbitrary and abusive governmental rule 
by requiring the agencies to provide due process rights in the course of 
rulemaking and law-applying activities.175 In the rulemaking process, 
agencies must publish notices of proposed rule-making and final rule-
making in the Federal Register and provide opportunities for comment 
after giving notice of proposed rulemaking.176 Additionally, agencies 
must respond to comments submitted in response to the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking.177 This process generates an administrative record178 
that can be reviewed in the court of appeals.179 In the case of applying 
regulations to particular facts, agencies utilize both formal and informal 
procedures, ranging from “internal administrative procedures [to] . . . 
direct[] . . . judicial proceedings.”180 Agency action is subject to chal-
lenge on the grounds that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in the rulemaking process.181 Agencies can be sued for acting arbitrarily 
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and capriciously in the rulemaking process and for misapplying and/or 
refusing to fulfill their statutory and regulatory duties.182 
B. The EPA 
 The EPA is a unique agency, in that it was created by an executive 
order issued by President Nixon.183 In his June 1970 Reorganization 
Memo to Congress, Nixon indicated that necessity was the impetus for 
the creation of the EPA and, that such action was “an exception” to the 
general rule against presidential agency creation.184 The agency’s mis-
sion was to assert “a coordinated attack on the pollutants which debase 
the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the land that grows our 
food.”185 The creation of the EPA was a response to the government’s 
prior approach to dealing with pollution, which assumed that different 
parts of the environment were distinct entities.186 Nixon’s centralization 
of environmental rulemaking turned this assumption on its head by con-
ceptualizing the environment as a singular entity with several interrelated 
parts and by granting to a single agency oversight of those parts.187 
V. Unitary Executive Theory Applied to Agencies and the EPA 
 The Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA creates an opening for 
regulating greenhouse gases (GHG) under the Clean Air Act.188 Sec-
tion 202 of the Act grants authority to the EPA Administrator to create 
standards for the reduction of pollution from mobile sources.189 Ac-
cordingly, the EPA recently made an endangerment finding that cate-
gorized GHGs as pollutants.190 Action by Obama pursuant to such a 
finding will likely spark constitutional challenges.191 
 Specifically, opponents could challenge Obama’s power to initiate 
the regulatory process via an executive order on the ground that it lacks 
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statutory authority.192 Indeed, the CAA specifically grants authority to 
the EPA Administrator, not the President.193 Some constitutional schol-
ars suggest that without an explicit statutory authorization from Con-
gress, the President cannot initiate the rulemaking process.194 This line 
of reasoning is bolstered by the fact that the EPA is often considered an 
independent agency195 and has recently been criticized as being overly 
politicized.196 Massachusetts v. EPA arguably creates an impetus for EPA 
independence from the President.197 Such an interpretation lends itself 
to the argument that if the President initiated the EPA rulemaking 
process under the CAA, such behavior would fall into the third category 
of presidential action according to Justice Jackson’s Youngstown opin-
ion.198 In essence, Congress’s specification of the Administrator of the 
EPA, as the agent of action under the CAA, is an explicit exclusion of 
the President from rulemaking.199 Arguably, an executive order should 
receive little deference in the courts because it is inconsistent with the 
express will of Congress.200 
 Given that the federal judiciary is primarily conservative and sub-
scribes to originalist readings of the Constitution,201 it is important for 
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proponents of the President initiating GHG regulations pursuant to the 
CAA to understand their position in relation to the dominant judicial 
ideology. This Note argues that the judiciary’s ideology and reliance on 
originalism is compatible with presidential initiation of regulating 
GHGs under the CAA via an executive order. Under the unitary execu-
tive theory, executive agencies are not conceptually distinct from the 
presidency.202 
A. Unitary Executive Theory Applied to Agencies 
 From a unitary executive framework, the Constitution grants the 
President the power to exert control over administrative agencies.203 
Article II “vests” the power to execute all laws of the United States with 
the President.204 Consequently, agency Administrators must get their 
power from the President.205 The fact that agencies can only be located 
within the executive branch supports this conclusion.206 As Professors 
Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash explain, “[t]he administrative 
power, if it exists, must be a subset of the President’s ‘executive power’ 
and not one of the other two traditional powers of government.”207 The 
Constitution creates three branches of government.208 It does not pro-
vide for an administrative branch of government and it blocks mem-
bers of Congress from concurrently serving in a law-executing function; 
therefore, administrative agencies logically fit exclusively within the ex-
ecutive branch.209 
 Moreover, the Constitution grants the President power to appoint 
all executive officers,210 including agency Administrators, indicating 
that the President has the authority to command and control them. 
The Appointment Clause states that: 
[the President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, 
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
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be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the 
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 
of Departments.211 
“President” is the subject of the Appointment Clause212 and “shall” is a 
helping verb213 that modifies the verb “appoint.”214 “Shall” has been 
used to express a command since the writing of the Torah, and this un-
derstanding of the word has continued into modern legal documents 
such as statutes and constitutions.215 The plain meaning of the Ap-
pointment Clause is that the Constitution commands the President to 
appoint officers of the United States.216 
 However, that command is limited in two ways. The intervening 
prepositional phrase,217 “with the advice and consent of the Senate,”218 
is the first limitation on presidential authority and the Excepting Clause 
is the second.219 Neither of these limitations contradicts the under-
standing of agencies that has been elaborated thus far. In regards to the 
condition requiring the advice and consent of the Senate on all presi-
dential appointments, constitutional scholars have shown that the 
drafters of Article II, Section 2 intended to give the President the broad 
power to appoint officials.220 Evidence from notes taken during the 
Constitutional Convention suggests that there was no intent on the part 
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of the framers to undermine the power of the executive branch.221 His-
torical evidence indicates that some proponents of obtaining senatorial 
consent for appointments wanted a means by which the legislature 
could hold the President accountable for the actions of executive offi-
cers who report to the President.222 Thus, it follows that the President 
would have authority over his appointees. Further, the Excepting 
Clause is not a threat to the broad power of the President to appoint 
executive officers.223 The term “inferior officers,” as it is used in the 
Clause, implies officers who are subordinate to the appointed principal 
officers that are subject to senatorial consent.224 Historical research in-
dicates that the Excepting Clause was inserted solely for administrative 
efficiency because it would have been arduous to subject every inferior 
officer to a senatorial appointment.225 
 Additionally, the President’s ability to remove executive officers 
shows that the President has authority over administrative agencies.226 
The vesting and take care clauses only delegate executive power to the 
President.227 While neither clause explicitly grants the President the 
power to remove executive officers,228 appointment and removal of 
such officers is inherently an executive duty.229 The historical record 
from the time period during and immediately following the ratification 
of the Constitution indicates that the average person would have un-
derstood the vesting and take care clauses as endowing the President 
with the power to remove executive officers at will.230 Both the federal-
ists and anti-federalists saw the President as having removal powers and 
relied on those assumptions in creating executive agencies.231 President 
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Washington also believed that he had removal power over executive 
officers, terminating many officers himself.232 
 Additionally, the Supreme Court has confirmed that the President 
has the power to remove principal executive officers.233 In Myers v. 
United States, the Court held that the President could remove Myers, an 
appointed Postmaster of the First Class, without the consent of the Sen-
ate.234 The Court reasoned that even though the appointment power is 
subject to confirmation by the Senate, it does not mean removals also 
require confirmation.235 The Court noted that the framers did not in-
tend to limit the removal power of the President, and that the Senate 
Consent Clause was part of a compromise and applied only to ap-
pointments.236 The Court also noted that the President’s removal 
power was especially relevant to executive officers, since Congress could 
define removal terms for inferior executive officers.237 
 In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the President had to provide cause for the removal of the Commis-
sioner of the Federal Trade Commission since he was not a principal 
executive officer but, rather, an inferior officer with quasi-legislative 
and quasi-judicial duties.238 The Court held that Congress could de-
termine and prescribe the method of removal for the Commissioner, 
not the President.239 Thus, the President has absolute removal power 
over those executive officers whose term of service is at the pleasure of 
the President.240 
 In Wiener v. United States, the Court was asked to determine whether 
President Eisenhower had the power to remove Myron Wiener, an ap-
pointed member of the War Claims Commission.241 While Congress had 
created the War Claims Commission and provided for appointments 
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therein, it left out any directives regarding the removal process.242 Con-
sequently, the Court was forced to look at the duties of the Commission 
and determined that the Commission had an “intrinsic judicial charac-
ter,” given that its members were engaged in adjudication as part of 
their professional duties.243 The Commission was designed in such a way 
as to be free from both presidential and congressional influence.244 
 Most recently, in Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court upheld an 
independent counsel provision in the Ethics in Government Act, which 
provided an opportunity for members of the Judiciary Committee to 
request that the executive branch, via the Attorney General, appoint an 
independent counsel for investigative purposes.245 The Act provided 
that the Attorney General could remove such counsel only for good 
cause.246 The Attorney General argued that this provision was unconsti-
tutional and violated separation of powers principles because the re-
moval provision prevented the President from fully exercising his ex-
ecutive duties.247 The Court ruled that the independent counsel was an 
inferior officer; therefore, the removal restriction did not meaningfully 
interfere with the President’s ability to execute his executive duties.248 
 This line of cases has presented a rule that “is designed not to de-
fine rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed 
at will by the President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere 
with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power.’”249 Nonetheless, 
the contours of the rule are relatively clear. Executive officers can ei-
ther be inferior or principal. In the case of inferior executive officers, 
the President has the power of removal that is granted to him by law 
unless removal restrictions impede the President from performing his 
executive duties.250 In the case of principal officers, the President has 
the power of removal.251 
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B. Implications for the EPA 
 The EPA should be understood as an executive agency that is led 
by President Obama, who is in turn represented by the Administrator, 
Lisa Jackson.252 The EPA is clearly an executive agency.253 Since the 
President has the power to execute the law only and not the power to 
make law, the EPA must be seen as a vehicle for executing laws passed 
by Congress.254 Consequently, legislative grants to the EPA represent 
congressional grants of authority to the President to execute policy 
goals through administrative agencies.255 
 The EPA’s subservient position to the President is evidenced by the 
role of its Administrator. The EPA Administrator is a member of the 
President’s cabinet.256 Moreover, as with all EPA Administrators, Jack-
son’s term runs concurrently with President Obama’s.257 Administrator 
Jackson’s relationship with Obama is not unique in that the previous 
two Presidents both used the EPA Administrator to implement their 
policy objectives.258 
 Furthermore, EPA Administrators are subject to the appointment 
and removal powers and the case law favors conceiving of the Adminis-
trator as taking direction from the President.259 Regarding the ap-
pointment power, the Administrator is appointed by the President.260 
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The President has the power to choose the EPA Administrator,261 and 
the Administrator’s term of appointment runs concurrently with the 
President’s, meaning the sitting President has appointed any sitting 
Administrator.262 
 Administrator Jackson is also subject to the presidential removal 
power.263 At the most basic level, Administrator Jackson—as a principal 
executive officer with cabinet-level rank—serves at the pleasure of 
President Obama.264 Since the Court has held that the President can 
terminate principal executive officers at will,265 it follows that Jackson 
must either obey directions from Obama or risk termination.266 
 Current case law on presidential removal power also supports this 
conclusion regarding Obama’s power to terminate Administrator Jack-
son.267 The Administrator is like the postmaster in Myers v. United States 
in that she is a principal executive officer appointed by the President 
with the consent of the Senate; therefore, consent for her removal is 
not required.268 However, the EPA Administrator is not like the Federal 
Trade Commissioner in Humphrey’s Executor.269 
 In the case of the EPA Administrator, Jackson is a principal execu-
tive officer because she has cabinet-level status, implements President 
Obama’s policy agenda, and executes environmental legislation from 
Congress on behalf of the President. Additionally, the distinction be-
tween the Federal Trade Commissioner and the EPA Administrator is 
further evidenced by the positions’ differing pay scales.270 The ap-
pointment provision for the EPA Administrator indicates that the officer 
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will be paid at level II on the executive pay scale.271 The Commissioner 
is paid at level III.272 Similarly, the EPA Administrator is not like the 
member of the War Claims Commission in Wiener v. United States because 
she is not an inferior officer and because her job does not require her to 
engage in adjudication.273 Finally, the Administrator of the EPA is not 
like the independent counsel in Morrison v. Olson because her job is not 
independent from the President, and the President’s having removal 
power over her is essential to his ability to execute the law.274 
VI. The President Has Constitutional and Statutory 
Authority for Reducing GHG Emissions  
Under the CAA 
 Global warming is becoming an emergency that warrants immedi-
ate action by the United States.275 President Obama has an obligation 
to lead the United States’ response to the climate crisis because there is 
currently no viable GHG reduction policy—especially one targeting 
mobile sources—under the existing federal environmental law re-
gime.276 
 President Obama can and should issue an executive order instruct-
ing EPA Administrator Jackson to create regulations pursuant to the 
CAA to drastically reduce GHG emissions from mobile sources.277 Con-
stitutionally, Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework justifies an execu-
tive order initiating EPA action; consequently, the Court would afford 
Obama’s order the highest degree of judicial deference.278 There is au-
thority for such an executive order.279 The Vesting Clause of Article II 
of the Constitution specifically grants executive power to the Presi-
dent.280 Agencies and their Administrators—including the EPA and 
Administrator Jackson—take their direction from the President as sub-
ordinate members of the executive branch.281 Therefore, statutory 
grants of authority to the Administrator can be interpreted as grants of 
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authority to the chief executive to use the specified agency to imple-
ment the policy goals set forth by Congress in the statute.282 
 In the proposed action, the CAA authorizes the EPA Administrator 
to create regulations to curb air pollution from mobile sources when it 
states that regulations “shall” be prescribed to “any” air pollutant that 
“may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare.”283 However, the CAA does not state precisely what the regulations 
should entail.284 The CAA delegates this responsibly to the EPA Admin-
istrator, provided that the rulemaking process is followed and that cer-
tain standards—including the requirement that only pollutants “rea-
sonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” can be 
targeted—regarding the content of the regulations are met.285 The re-
lationship between the President and the EPA Administrator and the 
CAA’s grant of broad authority to the Administrator supports the con-
clusion that Congress’s grant of power to the Administrator to design 
and implement pollution regulations is an implied grant of authority to 
the executive branch to use the EPA as a vehicle for creating an air pol-
lution control scheme.286 Therefore, under Justice Jackson’s Youngstown 
framework, an executive order from President Obama instructing the 
EPA to begin curbing mobile sources of GHGs per the CAA properly 
fits within the first category of presidential action because authorization 
is “implied” from Congress’s grant of authority to an executive officer 
who has cabinet-level status.287 
 Moreover, an executive order would not violate any constitutionally 
protected rights, including rights upheld by separation of powers prin-
ciples.288 The APA protects both substantive and procedural due process 
rights.289 In particular, an order instructing the Administrator to act 
pursuant to the CAA is by definition an order to abide by the APA.290 
The CAA delegates authority to the Executive Branch via the instruction 
that the “Administrator shall” regulate air pollution.291 Agencies must 
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abide by the rulemaking process specified in the APA.292 The adminis-
trative requirements, including notice of proposed rulemaking, oppor-
tunities for comment, and the EPA’s written response to comments, se-
cure the public’s substantive and procedural due process rights.293 
Additionally, such an order would not jeopardize separation of powers 
principles because Congress delegated legislative duties to the executive 
in the CAA.294 
 Examples of executive orders that President Obama may issue 
could direct the EPA Administrator to (1) set strict emission standards 
for future automobiles that will compel technological innovations; (2) 
propose regulations that compel or encourage states to set strict emis-
sions targets; or (3) establish an innovative permit scheme designed to 
both limit the use of mobile sources in the short-term and to fund re-
search and development of new energy sources over the medium to 
long-terms.295 Regardless of the avenue he pursues, President Obama 
has wide constitutional latitude to prescribe regulatory standards under 
the CAA to reduce GHGs from mobile sources. 
Conclusion 
 Mapping the national and international response to global warm-
ing poses a major challenge to President Obama. Given the climate cri-
sis, President Obama should not wait for Congress to take action. He 
should initiate the United States’ climate policy through existing tools, 
particularly the CAA. While the CAA may not be an ideal vehicle for 
launching a national campaign to reduce GHG emissions, it is a vehicle 
that already exists and has congressional approval.296 
 Conservatives opposed to a progressive climate policy will chal-
lenge the President’s agenda in the courts, where conservative judges 
who rely on originalist readings of the Constitution predominate. 
Therefore, the Obama Administration needs to justify its regulatory 
proposals in light of the judiciary’s conservative jurisprudence. Based 
on a unitary executive theory, President Obama has the constitutional 
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authority to issue an executive order instructing the EPA Administrator 
to issue GHG-emission-limiting regulations pursuant to the CAA. 
